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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78 A-4-
103(2)(j), as this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-2Q). 
Issues Presented For Review 
L Whether the district court erred when it transferred custody of the parties' 
minor children without making a determination that such transfer was in the children's best 
interests. This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 
652 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, \ 21, 989 P.2d 491. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied Mother's motion 
for new trial. Denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See 
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, *{ 21. 
Determinative Statutory Provisions 
Statutes that may be determinative of this appeal include Utah Code section 30-3-
10(l)(a) and section 30-3-10.4. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-10(l)(a), 30-3-10.4. 
Statement of the Case 
The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce in 2005. {See R. 181; a copy of the 
Decree is attached hereto as Addendum A-l). The parties have two minor children, to wit, 
Kyle J. Elison (bom 11/10/01) and Kaylee A. Elison (bom 9/13/03). Pursuant to the Decree 
of Divorce, the parties were awarded joint legal custody, and Mother was designated as the 
4 
primary physical custodian. (See id.) The Decree of Divorce contained a relocation 
provision which states, et alia, that if Mother moves from the state of Utah, other than to Las 
Vegas, Nevada, the children should remain in Utah with respondent, who would then be 
designated as the primary physical custodian. (See id, ^ 7). 
At the time of the Decree of Divorce, both parties resided in Iron County, Utah. 
Subsequent to that time, Respondent and Appellee Clinton Elison ("Father") moved to Salt 
Lake County and Mother moved to Washington County. In February 2009, Mother filed a 
petition to modify the divorce decree, as she sought to relocate to Arizona in order to take 
employment there. In May 2009, Father filed a motion for temporary orders and objected to 
Mother's relocation with the children. Mother also filed a motion for temporary orders in 
May 2009. (&>eR.222, 238.) 
The district court set a hearing on the motions for temporary orders on July 8, 2009. 
On that date, the Court heard evidence and argument. At the conclusion of that hearing, the 
district court ordered that custody of the children should be transferred from Mother to 
Father. (See Hearing Transcript, R.381.) No specific provisions were made for interstate 
visitation. This decision was based solely on the relocation provision contained in the Decree 
of Divorce. (See id., pp. 121-30.) Mother subsequently filed a motion to set aside this order 
on the basis that the district court had not determined that this drastic change in custody was 
in the best interests of the children. (See R.297.) This motion was denied summarily. (See 
R.328.) 
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Mother now appeals the order of the district court transferring custody of the minor 
children as well as the order that denied Mother's motion for new trial. 
Statement of Facts 
1. The parties were divorced on May 19,2005, at which time they were awarded 
joint legal custody of their two minor children, with Mother designated as the primary 
physical custodian. See Decree of Divorce (R.181). 
2. The Decree of Divorce contained a relocation provision that provided that if 
Mother moved from the State of Utah the children should remain in Utah with Father as the 
primary physical custodian. Both parties were residents of Iron County, Utah, when the 
Decree was entered. See id. 
3. In 2006 Mother moved from Iron County to Washington County, Utah. Father 
also moved from Iron County to Salt Lake County, Utah. {See R.238) 
4. On February 19,2009, Mother filed a petition to modify the Decree to permit 
her to relocate with the children to Arizona and be granted sole legal custody. {See R.201.) 
On April 9, 2009, Mother notified Father, in writing, of her intent to move to Arizona. 
Mother subsequently moved to Flagstaff, Arizona in May 2009. {See R. 238) 
5- ; On May 14, 2009 Father filed his Motion for Temporary Order and objected 
to Mother's relocation. Mother filed her Motion for Temporary Orders the following day. 
{SeeK222.). 
6. A hearing was held on July 8,2009, at which time the district court transferred 
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the primary care of the children from Mother to Father. This determination was based solely 
on the 2005 provision in the Decree that if Mother moved, Father would become the primary 
physical custodian. The district court did not make any determination regarding the best 
interests of the children when it ordered this change in custody. Nor did the district court 
consider the facts and circumstances surrounding both parties' moves away from southern 
Utah over the preceding 4 years. This determination was made during the course of oral 
argument {see Hearing Transcript, R.381, pp. 121-30), and was not finalized until March 
2010. {See order entered March 22, 2010, R.346.) 
7. On January 8, 2010, Mother filed a Motion to Set Aside, Alter or Amend the 
district court's ruling, and on January 22, 2010, Mother filed an Emergency Petition to 
Modify Decree, Permit Relocation and Establish Inter-State Parenting Time. {See R297, 
307.) Each of these motions were summarily denied by the district court on January 27, 
2010. {SeeK32%.) 
Summary of Arguments 
The district court erred when it changed custody of the parties minor children in this 
case without first making a determination that this change was in the children's best interests. 
The district court also abused its discretion when it denied Mother's motion for new 
trial, which motion was based, in part, on the argument that the district court had to first 
make factual findings that a change in custody is in the children's best interests. 
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Argument 
The District Court Abused its Discretion When it Transferred Custody of the 
Parties' Minor Children Without Making a Determination the Transfer Was in 
the Best Interests of the Children. 
Utah case law requires trial courts to make the following two findings of fact before 
modifying a child custody order: "[1] there has been a material change in the circumstances 
upon which the earlier order was based, and [2] a change in custody is in the best interests 
of the child." Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also Soltanieh 
v. King, 826 P.2d 1076,1079 (Utah.Ct.App.1992)); Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 
1982). The district court in this case failed to make either finding. Of particular concern, 
the district court made no findings regarding the children's best interests. Accordingly, its 
order transferring custody of the children should be reversed and this case remanded for 
appropriate proceedings to determine the best interests of the children. 
"[S]trong public policy reasons underlie the two-step requirement of these child 
custody cases. This procedure allows courts to monitor the best interests of children and 
especially to provide stability to children by protecting them from "ping-pong" custody 
awards." Wright, 941 P.2d at 650; see also Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624,626, 627 (Utah 
1987) ("[S]table custody arrangements are of critical importance to the child's proper 
development. The two-part Hogge test is founded upon that premise.... 'The rationale is that 
custody placements, once made, should be as stable as possible unless the factual basis for 
them has completely changed.'"); Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54 (same); Cummings v. Cummings, 
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821 P.2d 472, 475 (Utah. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 839 (Utah 
Ct App. 1991) (same); Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1987) ("the 
existing-placement presumption is based on the assumption that it will normally serve the 
best interests of the child."). 
"The important public policy to have courts ensure that a child's best interests will be 
met before transferring custody of the child applies in all cases involving the change in a 
child's custody, not just in cases involving disputes between divorced parents that are decided 
upon the merits." Wright, 941 P.2d at 651. "As such, in consideration of the strong public 
policy to safeguard the interests of children, we hold that before a trial court may enter a 
judgment by default that transfers custody of a child, the trial court must take evidence and 
then make findings that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred and that 
transferring custody of the child is in the child's best interests." Id. at 652. This is not only 
a mandate by Utah courts, but by the legislature as well. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(1 )(a) 
(stating that "any" determination regarding the form of custody "shall" include consideration 
of the childrens' best interests); § 30-3-10.4 (best interests determination must be made 
before modification of custody order). 
In Wright, the district court failed to make the two required findings set forth above 
before modifying an existing custody order. As a result, this Court concluded that "the trial 
court abused its discretion by modifying the child custody order because it failed to first take 
evidence and make the necessary findings," Wright, 941 P.2d at 652, vacated the district 
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court's judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. See id. 
The same error occurred in this case. The district court did not make a determination 
regarding the children's best interests before modifying the existing custody order. Instead, 
the district court simply noted that a best interests determination had been made at the time 
the Decree was entered into some four years earlier, and treated this case as if it were a basic 
contract matter: 
The court, by the Decree, has already ordered that custody 
would change if the Petitioner moved outside of Utah or the Las 
Vegas area. 
The court already determined that it would be in the best 
interests of the children for that to be the order and primarily 
because the parties stipulated to it; so that is what the parties' 
rights are at this point in time. 
March 23, 2010 Order, p. 3 (R.346, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A-2). 
These findings are further explained by the district court in its oral ruling: 
[T]he decree specifically provided that a change in custody would occur 
if one of the parties moved, particularly in this instance and in this sentence, 
if petitioner moves from the State of Utah.... 
Petitioner's testimony indicated, as one would expect, that she 
understood that provision and what the consequences of her move would be. 
Consequently, as a matter of law, a change of custody from the petitioner to 
the respondent is not a modification of the decree. A temporary order is not 
required. The Court has already ordered that custody would change. Upon the 
stipulation of the party the Court -- the parties, the Court made that order. The 
Court already determined that it would be in the best interests of the children 
for that to be the order and primarily because the parties stipulated to it. So 
that's what the parties1 rights are at this point in time. 
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9/8/09 Hearing Transcript (R.381), p. 125, lines 19-23; p.126, lines 1-13. The district court 
continued: 
But in any event, I don't find any basis for the Court to grant temporary 
orders which are at variance with the existing decree. And so the petitioner's 
motion for temporary orders is denied. The Court is granting the respondent's 
motion for temporary orders, but not as such. Because of the dispute between 
the parties, because of the nature of the dispute, because of the need for this 
hearing to determine the children's location, and particularly to determine 
which parent will have primary custody, I find it necessary to make this order: 
First of all, that the petitioner's move from the State of Utah triggered the 
change of custody. Pursuant to paragraph 7, the respondent is designated the 
primary custodian of the children. And the Court will order that that decree 
and that portion of the decree remain effective. Number 2, the petitioner's 
parent time is specified in paragraph 7. In sentences 4 and 5, the first sentence, 
first of those, number 4, provides certain things if the respondent were to move 
from the State of Utah. And paragraph -- or sentence 5 says, petitioner shall 
have the same parent time schedule if she is one that moves. I don't see any 
need for the Court to order anything otherwise. The parties contemplated this, 
the parties planned for it, the parties asked the Court to order, and that's the 
former order of the Court and it's the current order of the Court.... 
And again, I emphasize that this order is made pursuant to the decree 
itself and in enforcement of the decree, and as such, it is not a temporary order. 
Whether this changes in future will depend on the outcome of the petitioner's 
petition to modify. But in the meantime, the Court intends to enforce the terms 
of the decree itself and - and with that and with the guidance of Rule 106, 
make this order regarding change of custody. 
Id., p. 128, line 25; p. 129, 1-24; 130, lines 18-25 
There is no question that the district court failed to consider whether the change in 
custody it was ordering was in the best interests of the children at the time the decision was 
made. Instead, the district court relied solely on a stipulation of the parties made years earlier 
pursuant to a default divorce decree. This ruling failed to comply with Utah law and 
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constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Wright, 941 P.2d at 651-52; see also Diener v. 
Diener, 2004 UT App 314, f 5, 98 P.3d 1178 (4Cwhen presented with a petition to modify a 
child support order, the trial court may not simply rely upon a prior stipulation entered into 
by the parties and accepted by the court"); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407,410 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) ("Because an unadjudicated custody decree based on default or stipulation is not based 
on an objective, impartial determination of the best interests of the child, it may not serve the 
child's best interests."). As a consequence, the district court's order should be vacated and 
this case remanded for appropriate proceedings to determine the best interests of the children. 
See Wright, 941 P.2d at 652.1 
CONCLUSION 
The district court transferred custody of the parties' minor children without first 
considering or making factual determinations regarding whether that transfer is in the 
children's best interests. This constitutes an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Mother 
requests that this Court reverse the district court and remand so that this determination can 
be made. 
!The district court's transfer of custody, and the district court's refusal to set aside the 
order effectuating this transfer, are tainted by the same error - an abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, each order is subject to reversal for the very same reasons - the district court failed 
to consider the best interests of the children. 
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DATE: D this / day of September, 2010. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT^SEGAL, P.C. 
- ^ ^_-^ — 
DavidlS. Dolowitz 
Bradley M. Strassberg 
Attorneys for Petitioner and Appellant 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
965 South Main Street, Suite 3 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
40 NORTH 100 EAST, CEDAR CITY, UTAH 84720 
AMBER S.ELISON, 
Petitioner, 
CLINTON J. ELISON, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF UTAH, Office of 
Recovery Services, 
Intervener. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 044500347 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on May 31, 2005 pursuant to 
a certain Notice of Bench Trial dated May 10.2005. The Honorable G. Michael Westfall 
presided. Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by Stephen W. Julien. 
Respondent appeared in person but was not represented by counsel The State of Utah, 
Office of Recovery Services, was represented by Paul F. Graf. The Court conducted a 
discussion of the issues in the case, and it was agreed that the Petitioner and Respondent 
had readied an agreement on all issues as set forth in their Stipulation. The Intervener 
IRON COUNTY 
AUG-25-2010 WED 08:26 AM 5th DIST. CT ST GEORGE FAX NO. 14359865723 P. 
Amber S. Eii&an v, Clinton J. Elison, Sate of Urah, Office of Recovery Services 
Civil No, 044500347 \ Decree of Divorce 
opposed the child support amount set forth in the Stipulation, and a hearing was 
conducted to resolve that issue. The Court now having heard from the witnesses, 
listened to the arguments presented, and reviewed the papers filed, and having made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now upon motion of the Petitioner: 
IT IS HEREIN ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1, That the bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract heretofore existing 
by and between the Petitioner and die Respondent toaad thi? jfvmc are heretn dissolved, 
and Petitioner and Respondent a*r awarded a Decree of Divorce from tire other on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decreet* become final isaBaediatriy upon-
entry by Lhe Com u 
2, The parties are awarded the joint legal custody of their two minor 
children, namely: KYLE JAY EL1SON, bora November 10,2001; and KALEY ANN 
ELISON, bom September 13,2003. Petitioner is designated as the primary physical 
custodian and her residence the primary residence of the children. 
3, The following shall be the parenting plan: 
A. The parties shall meet no less than once each month, whether in 
person or by telephone, to discuss the children, their welfare, best interests, and to make 
decisions concerning the best interests of the children. 
B. In the event that no decision can be reached concerning a specific 
course of conduct related to the parties1 minor children, the final decision shall rest with 
the primary caregiver. 
2 
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C The parties shall always recognize the preferred caregiver status of 
Respondent, and shall make every effort to see that Respondent is given the opportunity 
to provide daycare for the children when he is available to do so when Petitioner is away 
from the children for at least four hours, 
D. Respondent's rights of parent-time with the children shall be as the 
parties may determine and agree, bearing in mind Respondent's preferred status as a 
caregiver for the children. In the event the parties cannot agree concerning Respondent's 
right of parent-time, then his rights of parent-time shall be not less than those set forth within 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§30-3-32 through 30-3-36, attached as Exhibit A. 
E. In the event that a decision reached by the primary caregiver, 
pursuant to the authority granted above, is unacceptable to Respondent, Respondent may 
seek relief through the courts. 
F. Neither party shall say anything derogatory about the other party, 
or about friends or family of the other party in the presence of the minor children. 
G. Neither party shall use any illegal substances or have any around 
the premises. 
H. Neither party shall have a person of the opposite sex to whom they 
are unrelated over night in their home while the children are present. 
4« Pick up and return of the children shall occur at the Family Support Center 
in Cedar City or as worked out by the parties. 
5. The costs associated with parent-time shall be split equally by the parties. 
3 
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6, For emergency purposes, whenever the children travel with either party, 
the party shall give notice of the following: 
A. an itinerary of travel dates; 
B. destinations; 
C. places where the children or traveling party can be reached; and 
D. the name and telephone number of an available third person having 
knowledge of the children's location. 
7- If either party decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more 
from the residence specified in the Courts Decree, that parent shall provide 60 days 
advance written notice, if possible, of the intended relocation to the other party. The 
Court may, upon motion of any party or upon the Court's own motion, schedule a hearing 
with notice to review the parent-time schedule and make appropriate orders regarding 
parent-time and the costs of transportation in exercising parent-time, Pursuant to 
agreement, if Petitioner moves from the state of Utah, other than the Las Vegas area, the 
children shall remain in Utah with Respondent who will then be designated as the 
primary physical custodian. In the event Respondent moves from the state of Utah, his 
parent-time out of state shall consist of 30 days in the summer, the Thanksgiving holiday 
period in even numbered years, the Christmas holiday period and spring break in odd 
numbered years and at other times as worked out by the parties. Petitioner shall have the 
same parent-time schedule if she is the one that moves. In the event Respondent moves 
from the state of Utah, Petitioner may also move out of Utah with the minor children* 
4 
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8, Each party's child support obligation is set at $245 a month, as set forth in 
Exhibits. Respondent's child support obligation is retroactive to December, 2004 . 
9* Either party or the intervener may bring the child support issue before the 
Court. Respondent's obligation to pay child support for each of the minor children shall 
terminate when the youngest child reaches eighteen (IS) years of age, or until the month 
after die child's normal and expected date of graduation from high school, whichever 
occurs latter. Respondent's obligation to pay child support for the minor children shall 
be automatically adjusted to reflect the base combined child support obligation shown in 
the table for die remaining number of children due child support. Except during periods 
of coitrt-ordered visitation, when physical custody changes, the parent without physical 
custody shall be required to pay the amount of support set forth above without the need to 
modify this order. 
10, Respondent shall be awarded a fifty percent (50%) reduction in his base 
child support award for time periods that Petitioner has the children for at least twenty-
five (25) of any thirty (30) consecutive days. If the dependent children are recipients of 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), any agreement by the parties for the 
reduction of child support during the extended visitation shall be approved by the Office 
of Recovery Services. Normal weekend visitation and holiday visits to the custodial 
parent shall not be considered as interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
11. Respondent's income is subject to withholding for the payment of his 
child support obligations herein. 
5 
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12. If either party is on public assistance, the party shall notify the Office of 
Recovery Services of any changes in their residence, employment, income or medical or 
dental insurance premiums or coverage, or change in custody, not including periods of 
court-ordered parent-time. 
13. The parties shall provide medical and dental insurance for the benefit of 
the children, if it is available at a reasonable cost through their employment The cost of 
said insurance shall be split equally by the parties. Any medical and dental expenses not 
covered by insurance shall be split equally by the parties. 
14. The party having insurance shall provide verifi cation of coverage to the 
other party, or to the Office of Recovery Services if on public assistance, upon initial 
enrollment of the dependent children. The party having insurance shall also notify the 
other party or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, 
premium, or benefits within thirty (30) days of the date of the change. 
15. A party incurring medical expenses shall provide written verification of 
the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other party within thirty (30) days of 
payment. The other party shall make their portion of those payments or make 
arrangements to do so within forty-five (45) days of receipt of the documentation 
supporting required participation. 
16. If a party incurs medical expenses and fails to comply with the preceding 
two paragraphs, that party may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses, or to 
recover the other party's share. 
6 
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17. Respondent is responsible and liable for one-half of the reasonable child 
care costs incurred each month as a result of Petitioner's work. Respondent shall pay his 
portion of these child care costs directly to Petitioner by the 5 th of each month. 
18. Each party shall maintain life insurance on his or her life for the benefit of 
the parties1 minor children, when it is reasonably available, and shall name the parties' 
children as beneficiaries on said life insurance policy. 
19. Petitioner may claim the tax exemption for Kaley, and Respondent may 
claim the tax exemption for Kyle so long as he is current on his child support at the end 
of the tax year, For the year 2004, the parties shall file a joint tax return and split the tax 
refund equally. 
20. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
21. Any debts incurred by the parties from the date of the marriage to their 
separation in December, 2004 shall be paid by the party incurring the debt, including any 
student loans taken out by a party. Any debts incurred in the name of both parties shall 
be split equally by the parties, 
22. Each party shall assume and pay their own debts incurred after the parties* 
separation on or about December 7,2004. Each party shall hold the other harmless from 
any liability on these debts, 
23. The parties shall provide a copy of their Decree of Divorce to all joint 
creditors for any outstanding obligations that are included in their Decree of Divorce. 
7 
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AmbcrS. Elison v, Clinton I Eliaon, Stele of Utah, Office of Recovery Services 
Civil No. G445G0347 \ Decree of Divorce 
Therefore, the party not obligated to pay a joint obligation shall; 
A. Send a copy of the Decree of Divorce to each joint creditor he/she 
is not required to pay as soon as possible. 
B* Notify that joint creditor of the curcent separate address of each 
party. 
C. Inform that joint creditor that each party is entitled to receive 
individual statements, notices, and correspondence required by law or by the terms of the 
contract. Also, inform the creditor that no negative credit report or other exchange of 
credit history or repayment practices may be made or a demand for payment on the party 
who is not required to pay the debt 
D, With regard to a creditor for medical expenses provided to a minor 
child, notify the creditor that a claim for unpaid medical expenses may not be made 
against a parent who has paid in full his or her share of the medical and dental expenses 
required to be paid by that parent 
24. The personal property shall be divided as the parties now hold i t 
25. Respondent is permanently restrained from bothering, harassing, 
annoying, threatening, harming or abusing Petitioner at any time or any place. 
26. Each party is responsible and liable for their own attorney fees, service 
fees and court costs incurred as a result of this action. 
27. Each party shall execute and deliver to the other party any documents 
8 
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Amber S, Elkoa v. Clinton J, Elisor State of Utah, Office of Recovety Services 
Civil No. 0*14500347 \ Decree of Divorce 
necessary to implement the provisions o£fhe Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
DATED this lS\r day of / J4fh , 2005, 
9 
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EXHIBIT A 
30-3-35,5. Minimum schedule for parcnt-timo for children under five years of age, 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children under five years old. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be considered the 
minimum parent-time to which the non-custodial parent and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) for children under five months of age: 
(i) six hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the non-custodial parent 
preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar to 
the child; and 
(ii) two hours on holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3«35(2)(f) through (i) 
preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child; 
(b) for children five months of age or older, but younger than ten months of age: 
(i) nine hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the non-custodial parent 
preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar to 
the child; and 
(ii) two hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) through 
(i) preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child; 
(c) for children ten months of age or older, but younger than 18 months of age: 
(i) one eight hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(ii) one three hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(iii) eight hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 3Q-3-5(2)(f) through 
(i); and 
(iv) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week; 
(d) for children 18 months of age or older, but younger than three years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the non-custodial 
parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day outside his regular place of 
residence, the non-custodial parent may, with advance notice to the custodial parent, pick up the child 
from the caregiver at an earlier time and return him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p*nx; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time may be: 
(A) two one-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the non-
custodial parent; 
(B) one week shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining week shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent consistent 
with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical one-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week; 
(e) for children three years of age or older, but younger than five years of age: 
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(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 pan. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the aon-custodiai 
parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day outside his regular place of 
residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice to the custodial parent, pick up the child from 
the caregiver at an earlier time and return him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
p,rn. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year, 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time with the non-custodial parent may be: 
(A) two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the non-
custodial parent; 
(B) one two-week period shall be uninterrupted time for the non-custodial parent; 
(C) the remaining two-week period shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the non-custodial parent at least two times per week. 
(3) A parent shall notify the other parent at least 30 days in advance of extended parent-time or 
vacation weeks. 
(4) Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 130,2001 General Session 
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EXHIBIT A 
30-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children 5 lo 18 years of age, 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be considered the 
minimum parent-time to which the non-custodial parent and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) (i) one weekday evening to be specified by the non-custodial parent or the court from 5:30 
pjn* until 8:30 p.m.; or 
(ii) at the election of the non-custodial parent, one weekday from the time the child's school is 
regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(a)(i); 
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
p,m. on Friday until 7 p.m, on Sunday continuing each year; or 
(ii) at the election of the non-custodial parent, from the time the child's school is regularly 
dismissed on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, unless the court directs the application of Subsection 
(2)(b)(i); 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not be made to the 
regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the non-custodial parent shall be 
responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(a) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period 
extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free from work, the non-
custodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the non-custodial parent, parent-time over a scheduled holiday weekend 
may begin from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend 
until 7 p jn. on the last day of the holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the non-custodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.ro,; at the discretion of the non-custodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday, 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m, on the day school lets out for the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m, on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24& beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p,m, the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the 
holiday, and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) 
plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m.> so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the non-custodial parent is entitled to the following 
holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p,m,; at the discretion of the 
non-custodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday unless 
the holiday extends for a lengtliier period of time to which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before fte holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday, 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m, on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m, unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
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(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 
p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday a 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to 
which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p,m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p,m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 
3Q-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so long as die entire Qiristmas holiday 
is equally divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m, 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) extended parent-time with the non-custodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the non-custodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the non-custodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent consistent 
with these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time during the 
children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the non-custodial parent's extended parent-time 
shall be 1/2 of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial parent lias holiday 
and phone visits; 
(tn) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with, the child shall be provided at least 
30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either parent concerning 
parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-time order. 
Amended by Chapter 99 2001 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 255,2001 General Session 
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EXHIBIT B 
THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COOOTY, STATE OP UTAH 
AMBER S. ELISON, 
V£, 
CLINTON J . ELXSON, 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
{SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
C i v i l No. 044500347 
1 1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this |mother and father for whom support i s to be awarded. | 
1 2a. Enter the f a t h e r s and mother's gross monthly 
Hincome. Refer to Instructions for definit ion of ((income. | 
J 2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that i s actually 
[(paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for th i s case) . 
| 2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not ((enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1) , 
| 2d« OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the ||Ghildren in Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
3 . Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This i s the ((Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes. 
| 4 . Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number 
nof children in Line 1 to the Support Table, Find the ((Base combined Support obligation. Enter i t here. 
Jj 5. Divide each parent f s adjusted monthly gross in Line jp by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 . 
£• Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain 
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$ 1786 1 
|$ 489 I 
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7 . BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring &o*m the amount in Line 6 
for the Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income 
Table. $ 244.50 
9. 
10. 
which parent is the obligor? { ) Mother (X) Father 
Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in line 7? (X) Yes ( ) No 
If HO, enter the aiftount ordered: $ __, and answer number 10. 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
( } property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
{ ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( ) o ther : 
Attorney Bar No. 1765 ( ) Electronic F i l ing (X) Manual f i l i ng 
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APPENDIX A-2 
Shawn T. Farris, #7194 
Farcis & Utley, P.C. 
2107 W Sunset Blvd., 2nd Floor 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435)634-1600 
Fax: (435) 628-9323 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
File No' 20057 09 
i IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
I IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH | 




CLINTON J. ELISON 
Respondent. 
ORDER RE: July 8, 2009 Hearing 
A 
Civil No. 094500270 
Judge G. Rand Beacham j 
1 
This case before this court for hearing July 8, 2009. The Petitioner was present along 
with her attorney of record. The Respondent was also present. 
This Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties have two minor children, namely: Kyle Jay Eiison, born November 10, 2001; 
and Kaylee Ann Eiison, born September 13, 2003 (hereafter collectively referred to as 
the "parties' minor children''). 
2. At the time of the Decree, both of the parties were residing in Iron County, Utah. 
3. The final Decree was entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, 
Utah, after a trial on the child support and after stipulation of the parties being made, on 
July 14,2005. 
4. Pursuant to the Final Decree, the parties were granted joint legal custody of the parties' 
children with the Petitioner being designated the primary physical custodian of the 
parties' children, and her residence, the primary residence There was not any address 
for the primary physical residence given, not even as much of a location other than a 
general assumption that it was Iron County; but that is not stated. 
A parenting plan was included and the Respondent's parenting time was to be at least 
pursuant to statute for joint legal custody. The pickup and return was to be at the Family 
Support Center in Cedar City. 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree has six sentences. Sentence 3 is the critical for this hearing. 
Sentences 4 and 5 are dependent on paragraph 2 and Sentence 6 is not relevant to this 
particular case. 
This court finds that the Petitioner was living in Iron County at the time of the Decree, 
and she later moved to Washington County. The parties' minor children resided with the 
Petitioner at the time of the Decree, and they have done so continually from before and 
after the time of the Decree. 
Since the entry of the Decree, both of the parties and the parties' minor children have 
moved from their residences in Iron County, Utah. 
After the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and for the past several years, the Respondent 
moved more than from Iron County, Utah to Salt Lake County, Utah; where he continues 
to reside at the residence of his sister. 
That the Decree states that: "[I]f Petitioner moves from the state of Utah, other than the 
Las Vegas area, the children should remain in Utah with Respondent who will then be 
designated as the primary physical custodian." 
The reasons for Petitioner's move to Flagstaff, Arizona are irrelevant. People are entitled 
2 
to change their residences, they're entitled to seek other employment or different 
employment or better employment. Whatever the reasons are, they are not particularly 
relevant to this case. But a move has consequences when we are talking about divorced 
parents of minor children. 
12. The court, by the Decree, has already ordered that custody would change if the Petitioner 
moved outside of Utah or the Las Vegas area. 
13. That court already determined that it would be in the best interests of the children for that 
to be the order and primarily because the parties stipulated to it; so that is what the 
parties' rights are at this point in time. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered: 
(1) The parties' minor children shall remain in Utah with the Respondent who shall now be 
designated as the primary physical custodian. 
(2) The change of custody from the Petitioner to the Respondent is not a modification of the 
Decree and a temporary order is not required. 
(3) The Petitioner shall have the same parenting time schedule as the Respondent has had. 
(4) The obligations and rights of a custodial parent as imposed by the decree are all now the 
rights and obligations of the Respondent. 
fU^fl ]/$4 \ D a t e d t h i s ^ ^ a y of March, 2010. 
T 
%s /BY THIS COURT: 
Q /r^pOGE G RAND 8EACHAM 
Q / $on. G. Rand Beacham 
< T\ ' ,/bistrict Court Jud^e 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
It is hereby certified that on the / o c day of March, 2010, a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing proposed Order was delivered by depositing a copy ofthe same in the U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, first-class, addressed as follows: 
Clinton J. Elison 
9884 S. Birdie Way 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
l^^yfr-^^ytf-
An Employee of Farris & Utley, P.C. 
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